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CRIMINAL LAW—UNDER THE GUN OF REHAIF V.
UNITED STATES: HOW STATE LEGISLATURES AND COURTS
MUST BLUNT THE EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE
Meaghan E. Collins*
For well over thirty years, courts across the nation maintained an
interpretational unanimity in applying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in
thousands of cases. This law specifies that a defendant commits a
crime if they were previously convicted of a felony and then later
possess a firearm in or affecting commerce. Under the original
statutory interpretation, the government was only required to prove
that a person knew of their possession of a firearm. However, in
2019, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned that
traditional understanding. Under the more recent interpretation, the
government is required to prove not only that a person knew of their
possession of a firearm but also that they knew they were a convicted
felon at the time of said possession.
There is significant importance in requiring a culpable mental state
where statutory elements criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.
However, proving such a high mens rea is inherently difficult and
stunts successful prosecutions. Thus, this Note acknowledges the
many arguments that challenge the Supreme Court’s decision based
on its harmful effect on prosecutions and inconsistency with public
opinion.
More importantly, however, this Note establishes how state
legislatures and courts must respond in light of this new, binding
precedent. Both should adopt approaches that would avoid the need
J.D. Candidate, Western New England University School of Law, 2022; B.A.,
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2016. Deepest gratitude to my family, friends, and
all others I have encountered along this journey. This experience has been such a blessing and
your support has meant the world to me. Additionally, sincerest thanks to the members of the
Western New England Law Review for everything you have done to help produce this Note, I
could never have done it without you.
*
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to prosecute altogether under the strenuous impositions of Rehaif v.
United States. But further, in the event of unavoidable prosecution,
both should take measures that enhance the chance to obtain
convictions favorable to public safety. Overall, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
does more to combat gun violence than any other law, and we must
act to mitigate the effect of the increased mens rea requirement
imposed by Rehaif.

INTRODUCTION
Suppose there are whispers of an Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL)1 supporter in Massachusetts. The supporter, Alexander
Ciccolo, plans to carry out an attack on behalf of the organization.2 The
government has been notified by a witness who believes that Ciccolo
intends to conduct a mass shooting at a state university.3 The witness
reveals Ciccolo has been building bombs and has secured possession of
various guns and rifles.4 As of now, no one has been hurt, but the
government needs to move quickly.5 To secure a hasty arrest, the
government decides to prosecute, among other charges, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)—felon in possession of a firearm.6 The statute applies, as
Ciccolo was previously convicted of a felony subsequent to operating
under the influence (OUI) of liquor.7 The OUI is a felony crime in
violation of Massachusetts law, subject to thirty months of
imprisonment;8 but upon conviction, Ciccolo was instead sentenced to
probation.9 Regardless of Ciccolo’s sentencing, his felony status leaves
him susceptible to the federal statute.10
Federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) provides that a person has

1. ISIL is a jihadist militant group predominantly located in the territories of Cyprus,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Turkey. ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria, is similar. However, ISIS specifically refers to Iraq and Syria. Jonathan Hogeback, Is
It ISIS or ISIL?, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/story/is-it-isis-or-isil [https://perma
.cc/DGY2-C3M3].
2. United States v. Ciccolo, No. 15-cr-30018-MGM, 2015 WL 9294206, at *1 (D.
Mass. Dec. 21, 2015).
3. Id.
4. Id. at *2.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *2 n.2.
8. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 29 of
the 2021 1st Ann. Sess.).
9. Raya Jalabi, Massachusetts Man Arrested by FBI in Connection with Alleged Isis
Attack Plot, THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2015, 4:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/jul/13/massachusetts-man-arrested-isis-attack-plot [https://perma.cc/DPJ2-ZVK3].
10. Ciccolo, 2015 WL 9294206, at *2.
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committed a crime if he “knowingly” violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).11
Section 922(g) criminalizes possession of a firearm when four elements
are satisfied:
(1) Status element;
(2) Possession element;
(3) Jurisdictional element (in or affecting commerce); and
(4) Firearm element.12

Thirty years ago, courts of appeals across the country had held that
the mens rea requirement (“knowingly”) was only applicable to the
possession element.13 Therefore, under the former interpretation of
§ 922(g), the only requirement was proof that a person knew of their
possession. The main premise for this holding was that Congress sought
to restrict potentially dangerous and irresponsible people from
possessing a firearm.14 Indeed, in May 2018, Alexander Ciccolo was
found guilty of his crimes consistent with that understanding.15
However, in 2019, the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States
held that the mens rea requirement must apply to both the status and
possession elements.16 As a result, the current requirement would be
proof that Ciccolo knew of his possession of a firearm and that he knew
he was a felon. The main rationale for this holding was that Congress
would require a culpable mental state where statutory elements
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct—in this case, possession of a
firearm.17 Under this present-day interpretation, conviction could hinge
on slight details. For example, would Ciccolo have known he was a
felon when he was placed on probation instead of serving prison time?
Should we allow such a dangerous individual to walk because he did not
know of his felony status?

11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
12. See id. § 922(g). Note that element one contains nine statuses: convicted felons,
fugitives from justice, unlawful users or addicts of controlled substances, “mental defectives”
or those committed to mental institutions, “illegal aliens” and certain other aliens admitted
under nonimmigrant visas, dishonorably discharged servicemen, individuals who have
renounced their U.S. citizenship, those subject to a court order related to domestic violence,
and persons convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor. Id.
13. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2210 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 2208.
15. OFF. OF PUB. AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRESS RELEASE NO. 18-1144,
MASSACHUSETTS MAN INSPIRED BY ISIS SENTENCED FOR PLOTTING TO ENGAGE IN
TERRORIST ACTIVITY (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/massachusetts-man-inspiredisis-sentenced-plotting-engage-terrorist-activity [https://perma.cc/F3HC-5LAM].
16. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194.
17. Id. at 2195.
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Proving such a high mens rea status comes with incredible inherent
difficulty.18 Indeed, the government in Rehaif argued that proving a
felon “‘knew and later remembered’ the nature of his conviction and the
potential penalties could be a challenge in some cases.”19 For example,
in United States v. Games-Perez, the judge in the defendant’s previous
criminal case for attempted robbery repeatedly failed to tell the
defendant he would become a felon upon conviction.20 In the
defendant’s subsequent criminal case, brought under § 922(g), proving
knowledge of one’s status as a convicted felon was not required at the
time.21 Consequently, even though the defendant did not know he was a
felon—as a result of the attempted robbery case—he was sentenced to
ten years in prison when he was later caught with possession of a
firearm—under the § 922(g) case.22 At first glance, such an outcome
seems unfair, and the new knowledge requirement accounts for that
injustice. However, in accounting for the injustices done to defendants
who are convicted of relatively less serious crimes, by requiring the
additional knowledge of one’s felony status, the requirement effectively
slams the door on the government’s ability to prosecute dangerous
individuals who plan or carry out more heinous crimes. Had the
defendant in Games-Perez been guilty of similar grievous acts as
evidenced in Ciccolo, a favorable conviction would be unattainable
under the statute as proving that defendant’s knowledge under such
circumstances would be impossible. Thus, Rehaif’s overhaul of the
traditional interpretation of the knowledge requirement inevitably limits
successful prosecutions under the statute when they may be needed
most.23
Section 922(g) has been the most effective federal law in combating
18. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (holding that “difficulty of proof
of knowledge” was considered when the Court opted for a strict liability approach to statutory
interpretation).
19. MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10290, WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW
CAN’T HURT YOU: SUPREME COURT TO ADDRESS KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT FOR FIREARM
OFFENSES 4 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10290.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU3T9ZZH].
20. See United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1137–40 (10th Cir. 2012),
abrogation recognized by United States v. Craine, 995 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2021), petition for
cert. filed, Craine v. United States, No. 21-5827 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2021); see also Evan Lee,
Argument Analysis: Court Leaning Toward Requiring the Government to Prove that a Felon
in Possession Knew He Was a Felon, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 24, 2019, 11:41 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/argument-analysis-court-leaning-toward-requiring-thegovernment-to-prove-that-a-felon-in-possession-knew-he-was-a-felon/ [https://perma.cc/TG
S4-VH63].
21. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d at 1140.
22. Lee, supra note 20.
23. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that it will be significantly more difficult to convict individuals falling into
§ 922(g) categories under a knowledge requirement).
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gun violence for years.24 Rehaif not only undermines that success but
may further unravel the work that § 922(g) has already done. Lower
courts have received numerous applications for relief that may lead to
the release of dangerous individuals who were already placed behind
bars.25
Therefore, in light of Rehaif, this Note will address the various ways
both state legislatures and courts must respond. State legislatures should
adopt legislation, and state courts should adopt procedures, that would
avoid the need to prosecute whatsoever under the strenuous impositions
of Rehaif. Further, in the event of unavoidable prosecution, they should
create legislation and design standards, respectively, that enhance our
chances of successful convictions.
First, Part I of this Note examines the relevant history of § 922(g).
It will describe how legislative intent, textual analysis, and public policy
all support the original interpretation of the federal statute. Next, Part I
will explain Rehaif and how its analysis led to the Court’s modern
interpretation. Part II focuses on the many arguments that challenge the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif, including an examination of
legislative intent and textual analysis. Part III of this Note argues the
many ways in which state legislatures and courts must manage the effect
of the increased mens rea requirement. Specifically, it will argue what
actions are required to avoid the need to prosecute under Rehaif’s
interpretation and, in the event of unavoidable prosecution, what
additional procedures would enhance the chances of obtaining
convictions favorable to public safety. Finally, Part IV will conclude by
identifying the potential complications that are likely to arise with these
new measures and how growing public support for reducing gun
violence squelches them.

24. Id.; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A
FIREARM (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FACT REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf
/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Felon_In_Possession_FY18.pdf [https://perma.cc/L89Z
-TE9D]; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (2017)
[hereinafter 2017 FACT REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/quick-facts/Felon_in_Possession_FY17.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG99-G8YT]; U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (2016) [hereinafter
2016 FACT REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
quick-facts/Felon_in_Possession_FY16.pdf [https://perma.cc/T25T-YRFB].
25. See Taylor v. Barnhart, No. 19-cv-00245, 2020 WL 5084027 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26,
2020), appeal filed, Taylor v. Warden, FCI Manchester, No. 20-6023 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2020);
Boswell v. United States, No. 5:20-CV-149, 2020 WL 5415252 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 13, 2020);
Jones v. United States, No. 20-22566-CV-MORENO, 2020 WL 5045199 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7,
2020); Gayle v. United States, No. 19-CV-62904-BLOOM/Reid, 2020 WL 4339359 (S.D. Fla.
July 28, 2020); Guerrero v. Quay, No. 20-cv-39, 2020 WL 4226566, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 23,
2020).
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I. THE HISTORY OF § 922(G) AND HOW REHAIF V. UNITED STATES
SHOT DOWN THE ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION
An abundance of heinous crimes influenced the first promulgation
of gun control in the United States.26 But, like many new laws impacting
highly valued constitutional rights, initial enforcement was often
unsuccessful.27 However, years later, gun control laws experienced
renewed approval due to momentous national crises,28 including the
murders of some of America’s most prominent historical figures. Gun
control laws, including § 922(g), have led to myriad prosecutions against
dangerous offenders.29 Before Rehaif, the narrow, original interpretation
of § 922(g) allowed for many successful convictions.30 However, since
the Supreme Court’s more recent, broad interpretation in Rehaif,
successful convictions are harder to obtain.31
This Part begins by detailing the relevant history underlying the
enactment of § 922(g). In addition, this Part will explain the language of
§ 922(g) and how different interpretations have led, and will lead, to
different prosecutorial results. Understanding the history and application
of § 922(g) over time will help to better clarify what approaches should
be taken to avoid the need to prosecute under Rehaif’s interpretation and,
in the event of unavoidable prosecution, what measures could enhance
our chances of convictions favorable to public safety.
A. The Inception of § 922(g)
The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA)32 and the Federal
Firearms Act of 1938 (FFA)33 were America’s first pieces of national
gun control legislation.34 Congress enacted both statutes in response to a
spike in “gangland crimes of that era.”35 The NFA imposed taxes on the

26. Sarah Gray, Here’s a Timeline of the Major Gun Control Laws in America, TIME
(Apr. 30, 2019, 11:13 AM), https://time.com/5169210/us-gun-control-laws-history-timeline/
[https://perma.cc/954L-JYPE].
27. See generally National Firearms Act, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS,
AND EXPLOSIVES [hereinafter National Firearms Act History], https://www.atf.gov/rules-andregulations/national-firearms-act [https://perma.cc/5R5D-CG37].
28. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2337 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
29. Jessica Roth, Rehaif v. United States: Once Again, a Gun Case Makes Surprising
Law, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 23, 23 (2019).
30. Id.
31. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that it will be significantly more difficult to convict individuals falling into
§ 922(g) categories under a knowledge requirement).
32. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (amended 1954).
33. Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968).
34. Gray, supra note 26.
35. Id.
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manufacturing, selling, and transporting of certain firearms.36
Additionally, the NFA required any persons transferring certain firearms
to register them with the Secretary of the Treasury.37 On the other hand,
the FFA required firearm dealers to obtain licenses and mandated
firearm sellers to keep records.38 State authorities regularly used the
Acts’ requisite record-keeping and registration information to prosecute
persons whose possession violated them.39
Unfortunately, it was not long after these statutes were enacted that
they began to face resistance. For example, in 1968, the Supreme Court
decided Haynes v. United States.40 In Haynes, the defendant was
charged with knowingly possessing a firearm that had not been
registered as required by the NFA.41 The Court noted that the
defendant’s charges were brought under one NFA section that, as the
government argued, “chiefly punishe[d] possession,” while the other
section that chiefly punished “failure to register” was left out.42
However, the Court drew no distinction between the sections, stating
each were “equally fundamental ingredients of both offenses.”43 This
meant that a “status of unlawful possession” was created in the first
section by the registration requirements of the second section.44 Thus,
since the Act creates a status of unlawful possession, one cannot be
compelled to provide incriminating information via registration
requirements in violation of constitutional protections.45 Subsequently,
the Court held that, in essence, where a defendant possesses an
unregistered firearm, a legitimate claim of privilege against selfincrimination would be a “full defense” against the NFA’s registration
requirements.46 After the Haynes decision, the NFA was essentially
rendered useless.47
Beginning in the 1960s, gun violence escalated to levels that
overwhelmed the nation.48 Between 1963 and 1968, annual murders
36. Id.
37. National Firearms Act History, supra note 27.
38. Gray, supra note 26.
39. National Firearms Act History, supra note 27.
40. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Castellano v. United States, 350 F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir. 1965)).
45. See id. at 95.
46. Id. at 100.
47. National Firearms Act History, supra note 27. To match, there was also little
enforcement of the FFA during the same period. See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and
Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. L. STUD. 133, 142 (1975) (noting that only a
total of 275 arrests were reported between 1966 and 1968 under the FFA, and no dealers were
ever charged with violations until 1968).
48. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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committed with a firearm increased by 87%.49 Aggravated assaults with
firearms surged by more than 230%.50 In addition, this was the decade
in which prominent figures in America’s history were assassinated.51
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.52 Civil rights
leader Malcolm X was murdered in 1965.53 Finally, Martin Luther King
Jr., one of history’s most famous civil rights leaders, and Senator Robert
F. Kennedy, also largely beloved for his civil rights advocacy, were
killed in 1968.54 These events, combined with the lack of current
firearms legislation enforcement, had a strong impact on public opinion:
“Faced with an onslaught of violent gun crime and its debilitating
effects, the American people demanded action.”55
By the end of 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Gun
Control Act (GCA),56 which stands as governing law today.57 The GCA
banned interstate firearms shipments to private persons.58 The Act also
strengthened requirements for gun dealers through reinforced licensing
and record-keeping procedures.59 But most importantly, the GCA barred
specific classes of relevant persons from possessing a firearm in or
affecting commerce.60 The GCA’s current prohibited categories of
individuals include convicted felons, those adjudicated as “mental
defectives,”61 “illegal aliens,”62 and perpetrators of domestic violence,
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Gray, supra note 26; Why Were So Many American Political Figures Assassinated
in the 1960s?, SKY HISTORY, https://www.history.co.uk/article/why-were-so-many-american
-political-figures-assassinated-in-the-1960s [https://perma.cc/37SX-62RB].
52. Why Were So Many American Political Figures Assassinated in the 1960s?, supra
note 51.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2337 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
56. Gray, supra note 26. The GCA significantly altered then-existing legislation,
repealing and replacing the FFA while substantially revising the NFA. Id.
57. See generally Gun Control Act of 1968, § 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1.
58. Olivia B. Waxman, How the Gun Control Act of 1968 Changed America’s
Approach to Firearms—and What People Get Wrong About That History, TIME (Oct. 30,
2018, 11:52 AM), https://time.com/5429002/gun-control-act-history-1968/ [https://perma.cc/
72V6-NFND].
59. Id.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
61. Although the term “mental defective” is outdated, it is defined by the following:
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that
a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness,
incompetency, condition, or disease:
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.
The term shall include(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and
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among others.63 Congress’s intent was “[to prohibit] dangerous
individuals from acquiring firearms.”64 As Justice Kavanaugh noted in a
related § 922 case, Congress recognized that “[c]rime and firearms form
a dangerous mix.”65 The GCA would “keep firearms out of the hands of
those not legally entitled to possess them.”66
In effect, § 922(g) has been a federal prosecutor’s workhorse against
dangerous offenders.67 Convictions under § 922(g) accounted for around
9% of all federal sentences.68 From 2015 to 2018, approximately 5,000–
6,000 sentences were imposed under § 922(g).69 Moreover, the GCA’s
imposition of steep penalties undeniably contributed to the nation’s
overall decrease in gun violence.70 In the last twenty-five years alone,
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by
reason of lack of mental responsibility . . . .
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2021).
62. This Note recognizes that the term “illegal alien,” like “mental defective,” is also
not a neutral descriptor. However, this Note uses such terms only to further conform with its
purpose of focusing on the specific language of § 922(g). For the purposes of the statute, an
“illegal alien” includes any individual:
(a) Who unlawfully entered the United States without inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer and who has not been paroled into the
United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA);
(b) Who is a nonimmigrant and whose authorized period of stay has expired or
who has violated the terms of the nonimmigrant category in which he or she was
admitted;
(c) Paroled under INA section 212(d)(5) whose authorized period of parole has
expired or whose parole status has been terminated; or
(d) Under an order of deportation, exclusion, or removal, or under an order to
depart the United States voluntarily, whether or not he or she has left the United
States.
Id.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
64. CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97TH CONG., FEDERAL REGULATION OF FIREARMS 21
(Comm. Print 1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/89777NCJRS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E6QJ-6PE7]; see also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (reiterating
that Congress wished to restrict “potentially irresponsible and dangerous” individuals).
65. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting);
see also Gun Control Act of 1968, § 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1. The stated purpose
of the GCA is to “provide support to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials in
their fight against crime and violence.” Id.
66. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113.
67. Roth, supra note 29, at 23.
68. Id. at 23 n.4; see also 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017 FACT REPORT, supra
note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
69. Roth, supra note 29, at 23 n.4.
70. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2337 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2) (“Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of
section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.”).
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annual murders committed with a firearm dropped by roughly 50%.71
The percentage of annual violent crimes, including aggravated assaults,
decreased by about 75%.72 It is important to understand this history and
significant impact of § 922(g) to better understand the consequences of
the Rehaif decision.
B. Rehaif and the Knowledge Requirement of § 922(g)
In 1986, Congress passed the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act
which amended 18 U.S.C. § 924 to add a mens rea element to the
prohibition.73 The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act states that only one
who “knowingly violates” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) shall be found criminally
liable.74 This new scienter element required the government to prove
that the “defendant’s conduct was knowing,” not that they knew their
actions violated the law.75 For example, prosecutors would need to
prove that the individual knowingly possessed a gun, not that the
individual knew their possession of the gun was illegal.76 Courts
uniformly limited the interpretation even further with unanimous
holdings that “knowingly” only applied to the possession element, not
the status element or any other element.77 More notably, many of the
highest state courts have interpreted their laws that are similar to
§ 922(g) to be read in the same way.78
71. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2337 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
72. d.
73. Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986); 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (“Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o)
of section 922 . . . .” (emphasis added)).
74. d.
75. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 10 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1336
(citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607–610 (1971)).
76. See id. at 9–10.
77. See United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1988) (dispelling the notion
that “knowingly” was to apply to all elements by citing House Report 495, which stated that
“[c]ase law interpreting the criminal provisions of the Gun Control Act have required that the
government prove that the defendant’s conduct was knowing, but not that the defendant knew
that his conduct was in violation of law. . . . It is the Committee’s intent, that unless otherwise
specified, the knowing state of mind shall apply to circumstances and results”); see also
United States v. Fulbright, 348 F. App’x 949, 951 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the idea that
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009), overruled Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, in
stating that “knowingly” should be applied to every element of an offense because that case
involved an entirely different statute); Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2210 (2019)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991); United
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705–06
(5th Cir. 2009); and many others).
78. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund in Support of
Respondents at 11–19, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525
(2020) (No. 18-280), http://guptawessler.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/NYSRPA-v.NYC-Amicus-8.12-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3G6-67UC] (collecting cases to
demonstrate that the federalist system permitted such interpretations when it came to public
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Recently, in 2019, the original interpretation was expanded by the
Court in Rehaif v. United States. Petitioner Hamid Mohamed Ahmed
Ali Rehaif, a citizen of the United Arab Emirates, came to the United
States on a student visa.79 The visa allowed him to stay in the country if
he maintained a full-time student status.80 Rehaif proceeded to fail all
but one of his classes at the Florida Institute of Technology, which led to
the termination of his enrollment status.81 The school notified Rehaif,
via e-mail, that his enrollment termination meant that his status as a
lawful alien would also be revoked.82 Subsequently, Rehaif moved from
the campus to a hotel, where he frequented a firing range nearby for
nearly two months.83 Rehaif was arrested under § 922(g) for possession
of a firearm by an illegal alien when the FBI found him with firearms in
his hotel room.84
Rehaif argued that, because he did not know of his illegal alien
status when he was no longer a student, he could not be convicted.85 The
Court recognized that, historically, the scienter requirement of § 924
only applied to the possession element of § 922(g).86 However, the
Court stated, “[w]e see no basis to interpret ‘knowingly’ as applying to
the second § 922(g) element but not the first.”87 Generally, courts have
applied the presumption in favor of scienter to be read into each element
that would criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.88 Meaning, the
government must prove that a person knew of their possession and knew
of their status (e.g., illegal alien, felon, etc.).89 This conclusion—now
binding on lower courts—has not gone without its challenges given the
significant number of prosecutions brought under § 922(g) each year.
Understanding the relevant objections to this new interpretation under
Rehaif will help to discern the actions that must be taken in response.
II.CHALLENGES TO REHAIF
Judges and scholars have challenged Rehaif with numerous
arguments.90 Many of these challenges stem from Justice Alito’s lengthy
safety).
79. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194.
80. Id. at 2201 (Alito, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2201–02.
83. Id. at 2202.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2195 (majority opinion).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2196.
88. Id. at 2195 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)).
89. Id.
90. See generally id. at 2201–13 (Alito, J., dissenting); Roth, supra note 29; Evan Lee,
Opinion Analysis Felons-in-Possession Must Know They Are Felons, SCOTUSBLOG (June 21,
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dissent in Rehaif.91 The primary concern among all critics is that Rehaif
fails to conform with congressional intent to restrict dangerous
individuals from possessing firearms.92 A second concern is that the
knowledge requirement Rehaif created is not supported by standard
textual interpretations.93 And finally, the last prevalent concern is that
the Court chose to rely on one provision of the Model Penal Code
without addressing why other codified portions, of equal weight, were
inapplicable.94 These arguments are but a few of many. Regardless,
they do well to highlight the predominant grounds on which different
authorities continue to challenge the heightened mens rea requirement.
A. Rehaif Ignores Congressional Intent
The main argument of the Rehaif majority for reading scienter as
applying to one’s status was to prevent the criminalization of otherwise
innocent conduct.95 Meaning, that simply being a felon or “illegal alien”
is not inherently wrongful unless that person knew that their status
belonged to one of the categories of prohibited possessors.96 On its face,
such reasoning appears sound. Yet, for that analysis to hold, Rehaif
would have us believe that committing a felony or perpetrating domestic
violence, for example, is the type of innocent conduct meant to be
protected.
That may be, but the congressional intent to “keep firearms out of
the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them”97 would suggest
otherwise. Justice Alito articulates this criticism best by looking to other
statuses § 922(g) lists.98 First, he focuses on the fourth status99:
Congress thought that persons who [are adjudicated mental
defectives] lack the intellectual capacity to possess firearms safely.

2019, 7:16 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-felons-in-possessionmust-know-they-are-felons/ [https://perma.cc/6ZRR-PLZT].
91. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2201–13 (Alito, J., dissenting).
92. d. at 2206.
93. d.
94. Lee, supra note 90; Roth, supra note 29, at 24.
95. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195 (2019) (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)).
96. See id.
97. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Note that element one contains nine statuses: convicted felons,
fugitives from justice, unlawful users or addicts of controlled substances, those who have been
adjudicated as “mental defectives” or have been committed to mental institutions, “illegal
aliens” and certain other aliens admitted under nonimmigrant visas, dishonorably discharged
servicemen, individuals who have renounced their U.S. citizenship, those subject to a court
order related to domestic violence, and persons convicted of a domestic violence
misdemeanor. Id.
99. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2207 (Alito, J., dissenting); § 922(g)(4).

COLLINS (DO NOT DELETE) &

2022]

6/13/22 9:38 AM

UNDER THE GUN

345

Is it likely that Congress wanted § 922(g) to apply only to those
individuals who nevertheless have the capacity to know that they fall
within the complicated definition set out in the regulation?100

To expand on this argument, Justice Alito focuses on the eighth
status: a person who is subject to a specific court order that requires
them not to harass, stalk, threaten, or cause reasonable fear of bodily
injury to an intimate partner or child of an intimate partner.101 With the
new interpretation, prosecutors would need to prove knowledge of many
different factual circumstances for a proper conviction under this
status.102 However, “[d]id Congress want a person who terrorized an
intimate partner to escape conviction under § 922(g) by convincing a
jury that he was so blinded by alcohol, drugs, or sheer rage that he did
not actually know some of these facts when he acquired a gun?”103
Finally, Justice Alito points to the ninth status: persons convicted of
a domestic violence misdemeanor.104 Justice Alito recognizes that
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have never agreed on the
meaning of a crime of domestic violence.105 Yet the Supreme Court in
Rehaif would now require the defendant himself to know.106 For these
reasons, challenges to Rehaif imply that one cannot honestly argue
Congress intended to protect these “otherwise innocent” statuses when it
explicitly sought to restrict these dangerous persons.107
B. Rehaif’s Ambiguous Textual Interpretation
As secondary support, Rehaif stated

that

basic

textual

100. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2207 (Alito, J., dissenting).
101. d.; § 922(g)(8).
102. See § 922(g)(8) (requiring the individual knew they received notice of a court
order, knew that the order addressed harassing, stalking, or threatening, and knew that their
conduct was directed towards an “intimate” partner, etc.); see also Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2207
(Alito, J., dissenting).
103. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2208.
104. d.; § 922(g)(9).
105. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2208 (Alito, J., dissenting).
106. Id.; see also Jake Charles, “A Rogue’s Gallery of Offenses,” Implications of Rehaif
and Davis for Prosecuting Gun Crimes, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. (June 25, 2019),
https://sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2019/06/25/a-rogues-gallery-of-offensesimplications-of-rehaif-and-davis-for-prosecuting-gun-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/PJ4S-TASP]
(“The [Supreme] Court left Justice Alito’s worries about other statuses for another day . . . .”).
107. Alito’s argument in support of congressional intent is further supported by United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). There, the Court also considered whether scienter was a
necessary element of offense when a man was indicted for selling narcotic substances. Id. at
251. In that case, the defendant stated he was unaware of the nature of the drugs he was
selling and thus could not be convicted. Id. However, the Court stated that “Congress
weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of
exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the
result preferably to be avoided.” Id. at 254.
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interpretations, commonly utilized in criminal law, support a reading that
scienter applies to the status element of § 922(g).108 Generally, scienter
is naturally read to apply to all subsequently listed elements of a
crime.109 Thus, if “knowingly” introduces a criminal statute, then the
word is treated almost like an adverb or adjective that travels through the
sentence, modifying each subsequent element of the offense.110 The
petitioner argued, and the majority agreed, that it would be “to commit
[a] sin” to read “knowingly” as conveniently leaping over the first
element, applying only to the second.111
Again, taken at face value, this argument would seem persuasive.
And, while what that argument maintains is generally true, it does not
apply here because the scienter element is not present at the beginning of
the statutory section.112 In fact, the scienter element is not present in
§ 922(g) at all.113 The element was added later in § 924 as part of the
previously mentioned Firearm Owners’ Protection Act amendment.114
Accordingly, Justice Alito argues in his dissent that the petitioner’s
argument—and thus the majority of the Court that accepts that
argument—is guilty of the exact same “leaping” argument it criticizes:
“[The Court] has ‘knowingly’ performed a jump of Olympian
proportions, taking off from § 924(a)(2), sailing backward over more
than 9,000 words in the U.S. Code, and then landing—conveniently—at
the beginning of the enumeration of the elements of the § 922(g)
offense.”115
Overall, the Rehaif majority stated that there was no reason to read
the mens rea requirement as applying to the second element, but not the
first.116 But it should be noted that Justice Alito’s textual argument
described above, concluding otherwise, was the first of many that Alito
brought to attention in his dissent.117 More significantly, Justice Alito’s
arguments are bolstered by the “practical unanimity” of appellate courts
interpreting their own analogous laws in the same manner for well over
thirty years.118 Indeed, considering both congressional intent and textual
108. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195–96.
109. Id. at 2196 (citing Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009)).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 2203 (Alito, J., dissenting).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
113. See § 922(g).
114. See § 924(a)(2). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
115. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2203 (Alito, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2196 (majority opinion).
117. See id. at 2203 (Alito, J., dissenting) (identifying more than four different
interpretational possibilities).
118. Id. at 2210 (citing United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695,
705–06 (5th Cir. 2009); and many others).
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interpretation, there were many reasons to keep the mens rea
requirement from being read into the first element of § 922(g).
C. Rehaif’s Reliance on the Model Penal Code
Finally, the Rehaif majority reached for Model Penal Code section
2.02(4) to bolster its argument that the scienter requirement applies to
the status element of § 922(g).119 The Code prescribes that where
scienter is a requirement for the offense, the condition must apply to all
material elements of the offense.120 But critics point out that Congress
has never adopted any portion of the Code.121 Further, critics argue that
the Supreme Court has never relied on this particular Code provision.122
Justice Alito recognized that there is no reason to believe Congress
meant to impose the highest mens rea degree in this way, especially
when the Supreme Court has previously held that “different elements of
the same offense can require different mental states.”123 Justice Alito
posed the following question: “Why not require reason to know or
recklessness or negligence?”124
A few critics attempt to answer this question. One legal scholar,
Evan Lee, an emeritus professor of law at the University of California
Hastings College of Law in San Francisco,125 addressed potential
culpability based on a “reason to know.”126 Model Penal Code section
2.02(7) states that a requirement of knowledge is satisfied if one is aware
of the high probability a particular fact exists.127 Lee indicated that the
Court could have easily accepted culpability based on section 2.02(7)
due to its “open reliance” on section 2.02(4).128 For example, Lee
considered Justice Alito’s hypothetical case, similar to Rehaif, where a
student’s immigration visa expired when the student failed out of
school.129 When the student’s grades were sent to him at the end of the
semester, he deliberately declined to look at them.130 Lee opined that the
student was aware of the high probability that his immigration status
expired, making him an “illegal alien”: “[H]is refusal to confirm that fact
119. See id. at 2195 (majority opinion).
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 121.
Roth, supra note 29, at 24.
122. Id.
123. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2212 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994)).
124. Id.
125. Evan Lee, UC HASTINGS L., https://www.uchastings.edu/people/evan-lee/ [https://
perma.cc/6TLQ-THFZ].
126. See Lee, supra note 90.
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
128. Lee, supra note 90.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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will not prevent a conclusion that he knew it.”131 Thus, section 2.02(7)
was just as eligible for the majority to use.
Additionally, Jessica Roth, a professor of law at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law in New York,132 addressed culpability based on
recklessness.133 In essence, Model Penal Code section 2.02(1)(c) defines
recklessness as a conscious disregard of a material element that exists.134
Professor Roth argued that the Court could have been open to
recklessness as the presumptive scienter floor simply because it
neglected to address whether recklessness would suffice in the face of
statutory silence.135 Professor Roth cites Justice Alito’s dissent in Rehaif
where he noted that neither the petitioner nor the majority had any
answer as to whether recklessness could be required.136 She then looked
to Supreme Court case Elonis v. United States, where again, the Court
did not address recklessness because “the issue had not been adequately
briefed.”137 Overall, Professor Roth identified a trend where Justices are
open to considering recklessness for culpability, which therefore could
have been used by the Rehaif Court.
Altogether, the aforementioned arguments based on congressional
intent, textual interpretation, and reliance on the Model Penal Code
represent only a few of the contentions with Rehaif. Unfortunately, as
compelling as these arguments may be, Rehaif still stands and is binding
on the courts. This Note includes these arguments merely to observe the
relevant objections that aid in determining the actions that must be taken
in response. Hence, the question is no longer about what the Rehaif
majority did incorrectly but rather what we are to do next in light of its
decision.
III. A TWO-TIER SOLUTION FOR § 922(G) PROSECUTION
In response to Rehaif, state legislatures and courts now have two
options. They should adopt measures that aid in precluding prosecution
under § 922(g) altogether and they should implement procedures that
ensure successful convictions favorable to public safety when
prosecution is unavoidable.
Section A will first address how state legislatures should adopt
stricter gun laws regarding background checks, record keeping, and gun
131. Id.
132. Jessica Roth, CARDOZO L., https://cardozo.yu.edu/directory/jessica-roth [https://
perma.cc/UU8B-7DQU].
133. Roth, supra note 29, at 25.
134. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)(c) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
135. Roth, supra note 29, at 25.
136. Id. (citing Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2212 (2019) (Alito, J.,
dissenting)).
137. Id. (citing Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 740–42 (2015)).
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relinquishment to meet these goals. Section B then details how state
courts could adopt procedures that satisfy both goals. First, courts could
require proof that newly convicted felons relinquished possession of
their firearms. Second, courts could adopt colloquy standards that
explicitly communicate the consequences and restrictions newly
convicted felons face.
All approaches meet the first goal of avoiding § 922(g) prosecutions
entirely by preventing prohibited possession in the first place. Some
measures have the direct effect of deterring possession by putting felons
themselves on notice of their inability to possess a firearm due to their
prohibited possessor status. Other measures have an indirect effect of
deterring possession by putting third parties on notice of that status.
Either way, prohibited possession by ineligible persons is precluded, and
§ 922(g) prosecutions are avoided.
Almost all approaches also meet the second goal of ensuring
successful convictions when prosecution is unavoidable. If the measure
taken has the direct effect of prohibiting firearm possession by making
individuals aware of their felony status, then they now know they are a
felon. This satisfies the new scienter requirement necessary for
successful conviction. Altogether, state legislatures and courts can
construct a two-tier approach dedicated to navigating the aftermath of
Rehaif.
A. States Should Enact Stricter Gun Laws
State adoption of new firearm legislation could reduce the number
of individuals charged with § 922(g) violations and possibly ensure
favorable prosecutions depending on the new law enacted.138 Over the
last few years, § 922(g) convictions have totaled roughly ten percent of
the overall convictions reported to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.139
Of that ten percent, there is a relationship between those states with
higher § 922(g) convictions and those states with less restrictive gun
legislation.140 For example, within the last four years, the Eastern
District of Missouri has ranked in the top five districts with the highest
proportion of § 922(g) cases.141 The Northern District of Alabama
138. See Annual Gun Law Scorecard, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/law
center/resources/scorecard/#AL [https://perma.cc/E4VV-HDMZ].
139. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
(2019) [hereinafter 2019 FACT REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/quick-facts/Felon_In_Possession_FY19.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7CP-UGJD];
see also 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT
REPORT, supra note 24.
140. See 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; see also Annual Gun Law Scorecard,
supra note 138.
141. 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
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accompanied Missouri on that list in the same four years.142 The
Western District of Tennessee was on the list for three out of the four
years.143 Every year, the Giffords Law Center evaluates these states
based on the strength of their gun laws in relationship to their firearm
violence rates.144 After evaluation, their Annual Gun Law Scorecard
gave the above states grades of F, F, and D-, respectively.145
Alternatively, states like California and Connecticut—which have not
been included in the top rankings for § 922(g) convictions146—received
grades of A and A-, respectively, from Giffords Law Center.147
Recognizing the statutory discrepancies, Giffords concluded that
“[t]o bring an end to our country’s gun violence epidemic . . . we must
take action to remedy America’s inconsistent patchwork of state
laws.”148 There can be no doubt that if low-grading states adopted
stricter gun laws regarding background checks, record keeping, and gun
relinquishment, such laws would prevent prohibited firearm possession
by ineligible persons to begin with. In turn, precluding prohibited
possession altogether likely decreases a state’s overall number of
§ 922(g) charges and possibly ensures successful convictions when
prosecution is unavoidable depending on the law adopted.

142. 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
143. 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT
REPORT, supra note 24.
144. See Annual Gun Law Scorecard, supra note 138.
145. GIFFORDS L. CTR., THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN MISSOURI (2020)
[hereinafter THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN MISSOURI], https://giffords.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Giffords-Law-Center-State-of-Gun-Violence-in-Missouri-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8YN-U22P]; GIFFORDS L. CTR., THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN
ALABAMA (2020) [hereinafter THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN ALABAMA],
https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Giffords-Law-Center-State-of-Gun-Violencein-Alabama-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E895-JLPA]; GIFFORDS L. CTR., THE STATE OF GUN
VIOLENCE IN TENNESSEE (2020) [hereinafter THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN TENNESSEE],
https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Giffords-Law-Center-State-of-Gun-Violencein-Tennessee-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2LT-G2ZS].
146. See 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
147. GIFFORDS L. CTR., THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA (2020)
[hereinafter THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA], https://giffords.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Giffords-Law-Center-State-of-Gun-Violence-in-California-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U75-WH7X]; GIFFORDS L. CTR., THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN
CONNECTICUT (2020) [hereinafter THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN CONNECTICUT],
https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Giffords-Law-Center-State-of-Gun-Violencein-Connecticut-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/JCN9-A5G8].
148. Leigh Paterson, Gun Law Scorecard Shows Some Firearm-Friendly States Passing
New Regulations, WAMU (Feb. 7, 2020), https://wamu.org/story/20/02/07/giffords-gun-lawscorecard/ [https://perma.cc/8AHF-V252] (citing language previously located on the Giffords
main page).
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1. Background Check Legislation
Laws requiring background checks are likely the biggest potential
combatants for satisfying the first goal of reducing § 922(g) violations.
Put simply, “[b]ackground checks identify individuals who are ineligible
to purchase firearms and prevent those persons from obtaining them.”149
Meaning, when background checks identify felons as ineligible to
purchase firearms, they are precluded from possession altogether and
avoid § 922(g) prosecutions entirely.
Such laws are strongly backed by nationwide public support.
Sources report anywhere from eighty-three to ninety-seven percent of
the population wants legislation requiring background checks.150 Public
opinion supports the overall purpose of background checks in
identifying, and preventing, ineligible persons from obtaining guns,
“making them a key element in preventing tragic and unnecessary gun
deaths.”151 For this reason, even states with less restrictive gun
legislation are likely to adopt background-check laws to better reflect
local values.152
Currently, the federal government requires background checks
under the Brady Act for some, but not all, firearm sales.153 The House of
Representatives introduced the Bipartisan Background Checks Act of
2019 to further this agenda.154 The bill proposes a universal background
check that would make “nearly all intrastate, private-party firearms
transactions subject to . . . background check requirements of the
149. See Background Check Procedures, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/law
center/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-checks/background-check-procedures/
[https://
perma.cc/KJR4-SGWR].
150. See Laura Santhanam, Most Americans Support These 4 Types of Gun Legislation,
Poll Says, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 10, 2019, 2:02 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
politics/most-americans-support-stricter-gun-laws-new-poll-says
[https://perma.cc/M2PG9R2S]; see also Katherine Schaeffer, Share of Americans Who Favor Stricter Gun Laws Has
Increased Since 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/10/16/share-of-americans-who-favor-stricter-gun-laws-has-increased-since-2017/
[https://perma.cc/NQ5U-D6J9]; QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLL, U.S. SUPPORT FOR GUN CONTROL
TOPS 2-1, HIGHEST EVER, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY NATIONAL POLL FINDS; LET DREAMERS
STAY, 80 PERCENT OF VOTERS SAY (2018), https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us02202018
_ugbw51.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9KT-FJKN].
151. Background Check Procedures, supra note 149.
152. See Santhanam, supra note 150; see also Schaeffer, supra note 150; QUINNIPIAC
UNIV. POLL, supra note 150.
153. Mark B. Melter, Note, The Kids Are Alright: It’s the Grown-Ups Who Scare Me: A
Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GONZ. J. INT’L L.
33, 55 (2012); see also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 34 U.S.C.).
154. WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45970, GUN CONTROL: NATIONAL
INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS AND RELATED
LEGISLATION 28 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45970 [https://perma
.cc/4RZQ-GHDX].
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[GCA].”155 However, absent formal introduction of this federal act into
law, the current federal regime leaves a loophole because it does not
require unlicensed, private sellers to perform background checks.156
Meaning, without state law requiring background checks, this loophole
stays open, allowing felons, domestic abusers, and other ineligible
persons to legally buy firearms.157 About eighty percent of firearms
bought for criminal purposes were purchased from unlicensed sellers.158
Around “[ninety-six percent] of inmates convicted of gun offenses who
were already prohibited from possessing a firearm at the time of the
offense obtained their firearm from an unlicensed seller.”159
Neither Missouri nor Alabama, both with F-graded laws,160 have
laws requiring private sellers to conduct background checks.161
Considering this in combination with the statistics above, it may not be
surprising that both were included in the top five districts with the
highest proportion of § 922(g) cases.162 However, unlike Missouri and
Alabama, Tennessee enacted a law to close the loophole gap in 2019.163
The law prohibits a seller from knowingly selling a firearm to a person
who is ineligible to receive firearms.164 This may be why Giffords Law
Center gave Tennessee’s firearm laws a D- as opposed to an F.165 Even
further, this may be why Tennessee was not included in the top five
districts with the highest proportion of § 922(g) cases for 2019.166
Therefore, it is possible that if Missouri and Alabama adopted a similar
law, they could decrease gun violence and further prevent § 922(g)
prosecutions.

155. Id. at Summary.
156. Lisa Dunn, Do Universal Background Checks Prevent Gun Violence?, WAMU
88.5 (June 25, 2020), https://wamu.org/story/20/06/25/do-universal-background-checksprevent-gun-violence/ [https://perma.cc/CPT9-BXX7].
157. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Adeel Hassan, How Online Gun Sales Can Exploit a
Major Loophole in Background Checks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/08/13/us/guns-background-checks.html [https://perma.cc/5LQL-W7W7]
(noting that about one in five firearm sales is still conducted without a background check).
158. Universal Background Checks, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/law
center/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-checks/universal-background-checks/ [https://perma
.cc/9K7W-G44J].
159. Id.
160. THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN MISSOURI, supra note 145; THE STATE OF GUN
VIOLENCE IN ALABAMA, supra note 145.
161. See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.014 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.);
ALA. CODE § 41-9-649 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.).
162. See 2019 FACT REPORT supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
163. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1316 (LexisNexis through 2021 Sess.).
164. Id. § 39-17-1316(a)(1).
165. THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN TENNESSEE, supra note 145.
166. 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139.
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While the new Tennessee law was a valiant effort, its language still
does not require a background check for unlicensed, private sellers.167
Thus, it does not close the loophole completely. All three states—and
others with less restrictive gun laws—could adopt more effective
legislation to help avoid § 922(g) prosecutions.
This legislation could attempt to mimic the laws of California or
Connecticut which received an A and A-, respectively, from Giffords
Law Center.168 For instance, both states require background checks at
the point of sale for “all classes of firearms, whether they are purchased
from a licensed dealer or an unlicensed seller.”169 In addition, both
states require background checks at the point of transfer as a second
safeguard to ensure the check was conducted before handing them to the
individual.170 Even more, California implemented a waiting period that
prohibits the sale or transfer before a background check clears.171 This
may be why California received an A from Giffords Law Center, while
Connecticut got an A-.172 Regardless, both states are great examples to
emulate due to the strength of their gun laws and absence on the list of
top five districts with the highest proportion of § 922(g) cases.173
Therefore, requiring backgrounds checks could decrease the number of
prohibited persons from possessing guns and would help to avoid
§ 922(g) prosecutions altogether.
It should be noted that background check legislation, even in the
exemplary states, does not necessarily meet this Note’s second-stated
goal of ensuring favorable prosecutions when they are unavoidable. To
meet this goal, as mentioned, the type of legislation adopted must have
the direct effect of prohibiting firearm possession by making individuals
aware of their felony status. This direct effect satisfies the new scienter
requirement under Rehaif, making prosecution easier. But unfortunately,
even if state laws require background checks, and ineligible persons then
fail those checks, those individuals may not be informed as to why they
failed. This means, for example, that people may be unaware they failed
because their criminal records evidence a felony conviction. Therefore,

167. See § 39-17-1316.
168. THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 147; THE STATE OF
GUN VIOLENCE IN CONNECTICUT, supra note 147.
169. Universal Background Checks, supra note 158; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2936l(f) (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 28050 (West, Westlaw through ch. 362 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.) (amended 2021).
170. § 29-36l(f); § 28050.
171. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28220(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 362 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
172. THE STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 147; THE STATE OF
GUN VIOLENCE IN CONNECTICUT, supra note 147.
173. See 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT supra, note 24.
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if defendants do not know they are felons, then the Rehaif scienter
requirement goes unsatisfied, and convictions are impossible.
Background screenings are regulated by the Federal Trade
Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act.174 These organizations entitle individuals to
certain rights, including notification of reasons for failing a check.175
However, these organizations generally regulate checks for
“employment, volunteer or tenant screening purposes” through credit
reporting agencies.176 Checks conducted for firearm purchases are done
by sellers and dealers through the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System—organized and managed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations.177 Thus, no federal laws regulate background screenings,
including notification of reasons for failure thereof, in this factual
context.
This Note recognizes that it is likely that, more often than not,
dealers and sellers notify potential buyers when they are otherwise
ineligible to possess a firearm upon a failed check. In turn, it is likely
that, more often than not, individuals who fail a background check will
then inquire as to why. In those expected instances, we need not worry
that people become aware of their felony status. However, for those
uncommon situations involving people who slip through these cracks
and remain unaware, state legislatures should consider easily curing this
shortfall within their background check legislation.
Like the
aforementioned federal regulations surrounding notification procedures,
states need only require dealers and sellers to disclose that individuals
failed a background check because they belong to a category of
prohibited possessors—e.g., felons.178 Thus, state background check
legislation would then satisfy both goals of avoiding § 922(g)
prosecutions altogether, while also ensuring successful convictions
where prosecution is unavoidable.
2. Record-keeping Legislation
Enacting new record-keeping laws would also help to reduce
§ 922(g) convictions. Law enforcement officers use sale records to
detect dishonest dealers and to identify “straw purchases.”179
174. Background Check Facts, ESSENTIAL SCREENS (Feb. 14, 2015),
https://essentialscreens.com/blog/background-check-facts/ [https://perma.cc/BE2M-DMLE].
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. KROUSE, supra note 154.
178. See Background Check Facts, supra note 174.
179. Gun Owners’ Privacy, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/firearms/ [https://perma
.cc/P3DU-WY8D]. Dishonest dealers are ones who, among committing other infractions, sell
to ineligible buyers. U.S. ATTY’S OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL FIREARMS DEALER
AND HER EMPLOYEE SENTENCED FOR SELLING GUNS TO FELONS (2018), https://www.justice
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Additionally, record keeping can help officers identify the purchaser of a
firearm that was used in a crime, “which can lead to the identification
and prosecution of violent criminals.”180 Thus, record-keeping laws aid
in avoiding § 922(g) prosecutions by deterring sellers and buyers from
putting firearms in the hands of ineligible persons from the start. Or
alternatively, if that has already occurred, record keeping may help law
enforcement track down those prohibited persons.
Like background checks, the federal government requires the
maintenance of all sales records for twenty years for some, but not all,
dealers.181 The pending Bipartisan Background Checks Act would close
the gap for record keeping, like background checks, by subjecting nearly
all intrastate, private party transactions to GCA record-keeping
requirements.182 But, until the bill is passed into law, the federal regime
is inadequate because it does not require unlicensed, private dealers to
maintain sale records.183 As a result, the system encounters a similar
problem with record keeping as we did with background checks where,
absent state legislation, the loophole for unlicensed dealers remains
open.184
Both Alabama and Tennessee, two of the states mentioned earlier
with grades F and D-, respectively, have laws that contradict the purpose
of closing the loophole.185 They instead require all records from
completed background checks for firearm sales to be destroyed after the
application is approved.186 Such laws limit record access to government
officials for use as gun trace data or data in legal proceedings involving
firearm dealer license revocation.187 Thus, these states, and others
retaining similar laws, must dispose of such regulations if they are to
help law enforcement identify persons ineligible of gun possession and
prevent § 922(g) prosecutions.
.gov/usao-ndga/pr/federal-firearms-dealer-and-her-employee-sentenced-selling-guns-felons
[https://perma.cc/U42M-TXMY]. Straw persons are individuals who buy firearms for persons
not legally allowed to possess them. See id.
180. Maintaining Records of Gun Sales, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords
.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-sales/maintaining-records/ [https://perma.cc/C8NBY5Q9].
181. Firearms-Guides-Importation & Verification of Firearms, Ammunition and
Implements of War-Record Keeping Requirements, ATF (Apr. 9, 2020) [hereinafter RecordKeeping Requirements], https://www.atf.gov/firearms/firearms-guides-importation-verifi
cation-firearms-ammunition-and-implements-war-record [https://perma.cc/DK3J-ZFHB].
182. KROUSE, supra note 154.
183. See id.
184. Maintaining Records of Gun Sales, supra note 180.
185. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-79(b) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-1316(j) (LexisNexis through 2021 Sess.).
186. § 13A-11-79(b); § 39-17-1316(j).
187. See Daniel W. Webster et al., Temporal Association Between Federal Gun Laws
and the Diversion of Guns to Criminals in Milwaukee, 89 J. URB. HEALTH 87, 95–96 (2012).
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In their place, these states could adopt laws similar to those of
California and Connecticut, again, with grades A and A-, respectively.188
Both states require the maintenance and retention of all firearm sale
records for both licensed and unlicensed sellers.189 To improve this
endeavor, both states also require all firearm sales to be reported.190
Even more, California is the only state that took its gun legislation a step
further when it created California’s Armed Prohibited Persons System
(APPS).191 The APPS is “a database dedicated to tracking firearm
owners who have lost their right to possess a gun, either because of a
new criminal conviction or something else.”192 California uses its
record-keeping laws to collect names for the APPS from court records,
medical facilities, etc., and cross-reference them against their
background check records for ineligible firearm buyers.193 The APPS
was designed and implemented in 2006, but it took time for the program
to gain traction.194 By 2012, around 2,000 guns were seized from
188. See supra text accompanying note 168.
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106(a)(1)–(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 362 of 2021
Reg. Sess.) (requiring permanent maintenance of any information relating to the sale or
transfer of a firearm); Maintaining Records of Gun Sales in California, GIFFORDS L. CTR.,
https://giffords.org/lawcenter/state-laws/maintaining-records-of-gun-sales-in-california/#foot
note_7_16026 [https://perma.cc/JD8W-QQAW]; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-31 (2021);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-33(e) (2021) (requiring record retention for no less than five years for
pistols and revolvers); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-37a(d) (2021) (requiring record retention for
no less than five years for long guns); Maintaining Records of Gun Sales in Connecticut,
GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/state-laws/maintaining-records-of-gunsales-in-connecticut/ [https://perma.cc/4NHF-ZBKY].
190. § 11106(a)(1)–(b)(1); § 29-31.
191. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., ARMED AND PROHIBITED
PERSONS SYSTEM (APPS) 2020 2 (2020) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA APPS 2020], https://oag.ca.
gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/2020-apps-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL94-M7LJ];
see also Richard A. Oppel Jr., How So Many Violent Felons Are Allowed to Keep Their Illegal
Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/us/gun-seizuresfelons-abusers.html [https://perma.cc/9L4C-2ATV].
192. Oppel, supra note 191.
193. Richard Gonzales, One by One, California Agents Track Down Illegally Owned
Guns, NPR (Aug. 20, 2013, 2:56 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/08/20/213546439/one-byone-california-agents-track-down-illegally-owned-guns [https://perma.cc/73L4-53B2].
194. See CALIFORNIA APPS 2020, supra note 191. Once the APPS was introduced in
2006, reporting increased as the number of firearms and firearm owners became known. OFF.
OF THE ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., APPS 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE 2 (2018) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA APPS 2018], https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/
attachments/press-docs/2020-apps-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL94-M7J].
But as that
number increased, the program began to experience complications—running into a backlog of
known persons that had accumulated in the system by 2013. See S.B. 140, 2013–2014 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2013) (appropriating $24,000,000 in funds to remedy the backlog). The program
“is tedious, expensive and time-consuming work, requiring hours of background checks and
cross-referencing even before the agents hit the streets.” Gonzales, supra note 193. Up until
2013, California only had thirty-three agents employed to enforce the program. Id. As a
result of the funds provided by the 2013 California Senate Bill 140, thirty-six more agents
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ineligible persons under the program.195 However, that number
increased as the program grew, with nearly 4,000 guns seized from
ineligible persons in 2017.196 For these reasons, it is clear that
California’s system is the best method for avoiding § 922(g)
prosecutions.
However, for states to create a program like California’s, it would
require significant resources.197 But States like Missouri, Alabama, and
Tennessee can begin to close the loophole and avert § 922(g) convictions
by implementing the previously mentioned laws California and
Connecticut have enacted. As noted, both California and Connecticut
are great examples based on the strength of their gun laws and absence
from the list of the top five districts with the highest proportion of
§ 922(g) cases.198
3. Gun Relinquishment Legislation
Finally, enacting a statutory process for firearm relinquishment
would help to reduce § 922(g) convictions and ensure favorable
prosecution when it is unavoidable. These laws require individuals
newly convicted of firearm-prohibited crimes to relinquish their
firearms.199 But unlike background checks and record keeping, there is
no federal procedure for removing firearms from prohibited
possessors.200 Consequently, Giffords Law Center found that, in
California alone, “more than 20,000 [people] have failed to surrender
firearms, despite becoming prohibited possessors.”201 In response, seven
states enacted laws to disarm ineligible individuals.202 Of these, only
were brought on board. Id. Overall, this history likely explains the gaps between 2006 (when
the program was implemented), 2012/2013 (when the program began report significant
numbers of gun seizures but also began encounter hardships), and 2017 (when reporting
numbers increased again and the program began to run more smoothly—likely thanks to
California Senate Bill 140).
195. Gonzales, supra note 193.
196. Oppel, supra note 191.
197. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
198. See 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
199. See The Effects of Surrender of Firearms by Prohibited Possessors, RAND (Apr.
22, 2020), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/prohibited-possessors.html
[https://perma.cc/6625-JNTD]; see also Oppel, supra note 191.
200. The Effects of Surrender of Firearms by Prohibited Possessors, supra note 199.
201. Firearm Relinquishment, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gunlaws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/firearm-relinquishment/
[https://perma.cc/ZYP8B9FD].
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 29810(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 362 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-36k(a) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7.3(b)
(Michie’s, LEXIS through 2021 Legis. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§ 129B,
129D (West, Westlaw through ch. 29 of the 2021 1st Ann. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.361
(2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 370.25 (LexisNexis through 2021 released chs. 1–429); 18

COLLINS (DO NOT DELETE) &

358

6/13/22 9:38 AM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:333

California, Connecticut, and Nevada require that proof of compliance
with these laws be sent to a court or local law enforcement agency for
verification.203
There is no doubt that these laws directly prevent prohibited persons
from possession.204 As a result, only a small inferential step is required
to conclude that these laws would subsequently reduce § 922(g)
prosecutions and, in the event of unavoidable prosecution, ensure
favorable convictions. States like Missouri, Alabama, and Tennessee
should enact similar laws to remove their names from the list of top five
districts with the highest proportion of § 922(g) cases.205
B. Court Requirements and Standards
In addition to state legislative action, state courts should implement
firearm relinquishment procedures and standard court colloquies. Both
measures could avoid possession and § 922(g) charges from the start
while also confirming defendants know they are a felon for inevitable
§ 922(g) convictions. First, even absent legislation, courts should
require proof that newly convicted felons relinquished possession of
their firearms to ensure defendants are aware of their inability to possess
a gun and their prohibited possessor status. Second, to further reinforce
defendants’ understanding, courts should adopt colloquy standards that
explicitly communicate the consequences and restrictions that
defendants—newly convicted felons—face. Both measures help to
ensure defendants know they are restricted from possessing firearms
post-felony conviction, but more notably, that they know they are felons
for § 922(g) prosecution purposes. Thus, these measures could help
prevent felony possession and avoid § 922(g) convictions altogether or,
in the event of unavoidable prosecution, help ensure successful
prosecutions favorable to public opinion.
1. Proof of Relinquishment
Courts could require proof of firearm relinquishment to reinforce
defendants’ understanding of their inability to possess a gun due to their
prohibited possessor status.206 As mentioned, there is no federal
procedure that requires newly convicted felons to relinquish their
guns.207 In response, only seven states have created a statutory process

PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105(a)(2) (2021).
203. See § 29810(a)(2); § 29-36k(a); § 202.361.
204. See Firearm Relinquishment, supra note 201.
205. See 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.
206. See Firearm Relinquishment, supra note 201; Oppel, supra note 191.
207. The Effects of Surrender of Firearms by Prohibited Possessors, supra note 199.
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for firearm relinquishment.208
Of these seven, only California,
Connecticut, and Nevada expressly require prohibited persons to provide
proof of relinquishment to courts or law enforcement.209 Absent state
legislation, more courts could simply require that newly convicted felons
provide proof that they have turned over their guns after conviction.
This would further emphasize that felons understand, not only their
restriction from firearm possession, but also their status as a felon. Thus,
these requirements could avoid § 922(g) prosecutions, or in the
alternative, help prosecutors prove defendants know they are felons in
the event of unavoidable prosecution.
2. Colloquy Standards
Judges who enforce and adhere to standard plea colloquies could
dramatically affect the number of § 922(g) prosecutions by informing
defendants of their inability to possess a firearm due to their prohibited
possessor status. This, also, would thus avert § 922(g) charges
altogether and ensure successful conviction if prosecution was
unavoidable.
A plea colloquy is a conversation between the judge and defendant
where the judge ensures that the defendant’s guilty plea is made
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.210 Within this colloquy, judges
have a duty to advise the defendant about the nature of the charge,
potential resulting penalties,211 and a few other important effects.212
However, while this duty requires communication about the above
information, other repercussions stemming from a guilty plea need not
be mentioned213: “For example, you can get in a fight, and plead guilty to
being in a fight, and wind up having a statutory prohibition on
208. CAL. PENAL CODE § 29810(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 362 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-36k(a) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7.3(b)
(Michie’s, LEXIS through 2021 Legis. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§ 129B,
129D (West, Westlaw through ch. 29 of the 2021 1st Ann. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.361
(2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 370.25 (LexisNexis through 2021 released chs. 1–429); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105(a)(2) (2021).
209. See § 29810(a)(2); § 29-36k(a); § 202.361.
210. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(G)–(I) (requiring communication of a defendant’s
minimum and maximum sentencing on a federal level); see also MICH. CT. R. 6.302; SEC’Y
OF STATE OF THE STATE OF CONN., 2021 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK 381 (The Comm’n
on Off. Legal Publ’ns 2021), https://www.jud.ct.gov/publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZFV8-9UKE] (requiring communication of a defendant’s minimum and
maximum sentencing on a state level).
212. See generally Plea Colloquy, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/plea_colloquy [https://perma.cc/TP38-8JX2]; Arraignment: Nature and
Consequences of Various Pleas Entered at Arraignment, JRANK, https://law.jrank.org/pages/
525/Arraignment-Nature-consequences-various-pleas-entered-at-arraignment.html
[https://
perma.cc/7WNT-9FC8].
213. See Plea Colloquy, supra note 212; see also Gonzales, supra note 193.
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possessing firearms get triggered for a 10-year period. But the courts
haven’t told them that.”214 Meaning, the main problem leading to
§ 922(g) prosecutions is that the judge does not tell newly convicted
felons they are prohibited from owning a firearm.215 For this reason,
individuals often violate the possession prohibition of § 922(g) without
realizing they had no right to firearm possession.216
The reason judges frequently omit the loss of one’s firearm
possession right in court colloquies is because of the difference between
direct and collateral consequences.217 Brady v. United States ruled that
defendants need only be made aware of direct consequences to give an
intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.218 Direct consequences are
criminal punishments that a trial judge may impose, including fines and
jail or prison terms.219 Basically all other consequences are collateral
consequences of which a defendant has no constitutional right to be
made aware before pleading guilty.220 Thus, “[i]t has [only] been
suggested that it is desirable to inform a defendant of additional
consequences which might follow from his plea of guilty.”221 Felons’
loss of their right to possess a firearm under the Second Amendment is
considered a collateral consequence.222
Because collateral consequences can be equally important,223 many
have acknowledged that it is time to revisit this rule.224 Some critics
argue that the firearm prohibition cannot be easily categorized as a direct
or collateral consequence and subsequently blurs the distinguishing
line.225 Those agreeing with this argument contend that any implication
of a constitutional right—the Second Amendment in this case—should
214. Gonzales, supra note 193.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
218. Id.
219. Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 670, 672 (2008).
220. Id.; see also Vivian Chang, Note, Where Do We Go from Here: Plea Colloquy
Warnings and Immigration Consequences Post-Padilla, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 189, 190
(2011).
221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment (emphasis
added).
222. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION 15 (2000), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
pardon/legacy/2006/11/13/collateral_consequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ6M-GE27].
223. Chang, supra note 220.
224. Roberts, supra note 219, at 674.
225. Steve Colella, Comment, “Guilty, Your Honor”: The Direct and Collateral
Consequences of Guilty Pleas and the Courts That Inconsistently Interpret Them, 26
WHITTIER L. REV. 305, 310 (2004).
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be categorized as a direct consequence.226 Others critics argue for a
reasonableness standard that determines the duty to inform defendants
where the consequence is a “significant factor” in their decision to plead
guilty.227
Some judges (mainly federal judges), possibly in agreement with
these arguments, have taken it upon themselves to include certain
collateral consequences in their colloquies.228 But unfortunately, the
dividing line between direct and collateral consequences remains
Therefore, while some judges include collateral
unchanged.229
consequence communication in their colloquies, doing so is still not
required and occurs only on an inconsistent basis.230 This may be
because some recognize that to include a list of all the potential collateral
consequences a defendant may face would place a significant burden on
the courts.231 In addition, trying to categorize particular consequences,232
or using a test to classify their importance,233 may be ideal in theory, but
difficult and unrealistic in practice.
A simpler, more effective argument may be made: courts should
create a standard colloquy that communicates consequences any time a
defendant is stripped of a constitutional right.234 Any attempt at the
categorization of firearm possession as a direct or indirect collateral
consequence is unnecessary. For decades, courts have recognized that
waiver of constitutional rights involves “an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”235 Therefore, judges are
required to provide notice to defendants of such constitutional rights,
including the right to trial by jury and the right to confront one’s

226. Id. at 311–13.
227. Roberts, supra note 219, at 674.
228. See, e.g., JAMES P. JONES, GUILTY PLEA COLLOQUY 3 (2017), http://www.vawd.
uscourts.gov/media/1966/guiltypleacolloquy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XK7-FAB4].
229. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
230. Compare JAMES P. JONES, GUILTY PLEA COLLOQUY 3 (2017), http://www.vawd.
uscourts.gov/media/1966/guiltypleacolloquy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XK7-FAB4] (showcasing
a federal court colloquy mentioning the collateral consequences a defendant potentially faces),
with CT. OF COMMON PLEAS OF CRAWFORD CNTY., PA, DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE
ENTERING OF A GUILTY PLEA OR PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE (NO CONTEST) (2018),
https://www.crawfordcountypa.net/Courts/Documents/Written%20Plea%20Colloquy.PDF
[https://perma.cc/4ZP3-NXVZ] (showcasing a state court colloquy making no mention of any
collateral consequences a defendant could encounter).
231. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 390–91 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that criminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences and lead to a subsequent
inability to know what area of advice would be relevant).
232. Colella, supra note 225, at 310–13.
233. Roberts, supra note 219, at 672.
234. No consequence categorization or testing standard need be utilized.
235. Mary Kay Wheeler, Comment, Guilty Plea Colloquies: Let the Record Show . . .,
45 MONT. L. REV. 295, 296 (1984) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S 458, 464 (1938)).
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accusers.236 Granted, notification of waiver regarding these two
examples is for fair-trial purposes, but the underlying premise of notice
before abandonment or relinquishment of a constitutional right is the
same. Why should notice of waiver of these constitutional rights not
then also be extended to other constitutional rights?
In further support of established standard colloquies is that they
“would assist the court in making an on-the-record assessment that meets
the constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea.”237 Even more,
this set standard would help keep judicial colloquies simple. Judges
would not need to consider if the constitutional right was indeed a direct
consequence. They would not need to conduct ambiguous, and possibly
Simply, if a defendant’s
inconsistent, unreasonable tests.238
constitutional right would be seized, a standard court colloquy would
state that such an implication needs to be communicated. Subsequently,
felons would agree within their plea colloquies that they understand they
are restricted from possessing firearms post-conviction and know of their
prohibited possessor status. Thus, they could avoid felony possession
and § 922(g) convictions altogether, or help prosecutors prove
defendants know they are felons in the event of unavoidable prosecution.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Historically, the introduction of firearm legislation and additional
court procedures have been challenged with Second Amendment
claims239 and on procedural efficiency grounds, respectively.240
However, each argument is of no consequence here.
First, the Second Amendment does not prohibit the enforcement of
gun laws and procedures.241 The Second Amendment does state that it is
a person’s right to keep and bear arms.242 But, “[the Second
Amendment] is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”243 Thus, laws that
impose certain conditions and qualifications on the sale of firearms are
constitutional.244 For instance, state laws that require background checks
236. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S 238, 243 (1969).
237. Wheeler, supra note 235, at 295.
238. Roberts, supra note 219, at 672.
239. See generally Todd Barnet, Gun “Control” Laws Violate the Second Amendment
and May Lead to Higher Crime Rates, 63 MO. L. REV. 155 (1998); Should More Gun Control
Laws Be Enacted?, BRITANNICA PROCON.ORG, https://gun-control.procon.org [https://
perma.cc/5NE2-WVSM].
240. Roberts, supra note 219, at 736; Should More Gun Control Laws Be Enacted?,
supra note 240.
241. See District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
243. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
244. See id. at 626–28.

COLLINS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

6/13/22 9:38 AM

UNDER THE GUN

363

are constitutional.245 Courts have not hesitated to note that background
checks serve a multitude of government interests, including, but not
limited to, preventing convicted felons from obtaining firearms246 and
ensuring a secure workplace comprised of competent and reliable
Because requirements serving clearly sound
employees.247
governmental interests are acceptable, very few have challenged them.248
The few that have challenged them on Second Amendment grounds have
never succeeded.249 Therefore, states legislatures that choose to adopt
statutes like California’s and Connecticut’s, or state courts that choose to
enforce relinquishment procedures, would likely prevail if faced with
constitutional challenges. These measures merely impose a few
conditions and qualifications on the sale of firearms to prevent future
§ 922(g) charges and aid in ensuring successful convictions where
prosecution is unavoidable.
Second, some states may resist enacting strict gun procedures for
efficacy reasons.250 However, all measures this Note proposes help
avoid § 922(g) prosecutions altogether. Thus, considering the significant
costs and time generally dedicated to litigation, these measures actually
aid efficiency. And, in the event of inevitable prosecution, almost all
procedures this Note recommends, except for record-keeping legislation,
actually make litigation easier. Meaning, if enforced properly, these
measures ensure that defendants know of their prohibited possessor
status, thus easily satisfying one element of a § 922(g) offense at trial.
But most importantly, and above all, procedural efficiency is no match
against ensuring defendants understand their constitutional rights in
criminal cases.
In response to both of these arguments critics make, sometimes the
national public push can be overwhelming.251 “When more and more
245. Everytown Law, Requiring Background Checks for All Gun Sales: Critical for
Public Safety and Clearly Constitutional, MEDIUM (Sept. 9, 2019), https://medium.com/
everytown-law/background-checks-for-all-gun-sales-critical-for-public-safety-and-clearlyconstitutional-1ba9f8c24a52 [https://perma.cc/VJF4-HAZY].
246. See id.
247. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 150 (2011).
248. See Everytown Law, supra note 246.
249. See, e.g., Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537, 554 (10th Cir.
2016) (stating that petitioners lacked constitutional standing to even challenge background
checks as a violation of the Second Amendment); Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v.
Hickenlooper, 371 P.3d 768, 777 (Colo. App. 2016) (explicitly remarking that a bill imposing
mandatory background checks does not infringe on one’s constitutional right to bear arms),
decision reached on appeal, 472 P.3d 10 (Colo. App. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain
Gun Owners v. Polis, 467 P.3d 314 (Colo. 2020).
250. Roberts, supra note 219; Should More Gun Control Laws Be Enacted?, supra note
240.
251. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Background Check Bill Marks Gun Control as a Priority
for House Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/
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people recognize that [gun violence] is a national issue that can affect all
of us . . . then cultural change happens, and that’s what we’re seeing
now.”252 For example, the Las Vegas Route 91 Concert shooting, the
Sutherland Springs Church shooting, and the Parkland School shooting
caused most states to quickly enact some legislation in their wake.253
States inevitably enforce these changes, in part, due to public pressure.254
Roughly 60% of Americans supported gun control just days after the
Vegas shooting.255 After the Parkland School shooting, the number of
Americans who wanted stricter gun legislation shot up from 7% to 67%
in five months.256 As a result, many individuals support gun control that
keeps firearms out of the hands of ineligible persons.257 Therefore,
government resistance against stricter gun measures often bends when
pitted against public fury in an effort to better reflect national demands.
CONCLUSION
Overall, Rehaif v. United States was right to require a culpable
mental state where statutory elements criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct. But as a result, Rehaif inevitably limited the number of
successful prosecutions possible under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).258 The Court
upended an interpretational standard in applying § 922(g) that had been
established precedent for well over thirty years.259 Originally, courts had
interpreted that statute to mean the government need only prove a person
Since Rehaif, however, the
knew they possessed a firearm.260
government must now prove a person knew they possessed a firearm and
that they were part of a category of persons prohibited from such
possession.261
Justice Alito and other critics identified the many challenges that
can be made against Rehaif.262 They include, but are not limited to, the
majority’s disregard of congressional intent and its use of ambiguous
politics/house-democrats-gun-control.html [https://perma.cc/D7JV-MAKA].
252. Id.
253. See Megan B. Mavis & Matthew D. Shapiro, Second Amendment Interpretation
and a Critique of the Resistance to Common-Sense Gun Regulation in the Face of Gun
Violence: This Is America, 46 W. STATE L. REV. 85, 112–13 (2019).
254. See id. at 105.
255. Id. at 103.
256. Id. at 105.
257. See Santhanam, supra note 150.
258. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that it will be significantly more difficult to convict individuals falling into
§ 922(g) categories under a knowledge requirement).
259. Id. at 2210.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2194 (majority opinion).
262. See id. at 2201 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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textual interpretations.263 Such arguments are notable and helped to
determine how to best bear the brunt of the increased mens rea
requirement.
Therefore, because this statute does more to combat gun violence
than any other law,264 state legislatures and courts must adjust
accordingly under Rehaif’s binding precedent. They could adopt
approaches that would avoid the need to even prosecute under the
strenuous impositions of Rehaif. But further, in the event of unavoidable
prosecution, they could then take measures that enhance our chances of
successful prosecutions favorable to public opinion.
First, state legislatures could adopt stricter laws in line with public
support for reducing gun violence. For example, they could enact laws
managing firearm background checks, record keeping, and gun
relinquishment upon recent felony convictions. Such legislation would
attempt to control dangerous individuals—preventing prohibited
possession to begin with—and sidestep likely unsuccessful § 922(g)
prosecutions.
Second, state courts could implement requirements and standards
that would also preclude § 922(g) prosecutions altogether, but that would
also result in easier convictions under the statute where prosecution is
unavoidable. For instance, courts could require proof when gun
relinquishment is required by state statutes. They could also create
explicit, standard plea colloquies to ensure defendants understand how
their conviction consequently affects their constitutional rights as a
felon.
Implementation of both requisite measures would notify
defendants of their inability to possess a gun due to their prohibited
possessor status. Thus, both measures could aid in preventing
possession in the first place while also, in the alternative, help to confirm
defendants know they are felons for unavoidable § 922(g) prosecutions.
Overall, even though Rehaif has been challenged on many grounds,
it stands as binding precedent. Regardless, state legislatures and courts
can still navigate the new scienter requirement without being burdened
by Rehaif’s limitation on § 922(g) prosecutions. But, they must be
willing to take up that mantle.

263. See id.
264. See 2019 FACT REPORT, supra note 139; 2018 FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2017
FACT REPORT, supra note 24; 2016 FACT REPORT, supra note 24.

COLLINS (DO NOT DELETE)

366

6/13/22 9:38 AM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:333

